346 R. Vecellio Segate coercion and subjugation, not least in the form of political sanctions (Bogdanova 2022, 55; Franco 2015; Peksen 2017). No doubt exists that some of these sanctions may be justified on ethical grounds (e.g. when implemented to exercise pressure on, say, Russian oligarchs against their factual involvement in Ukraine’s invasion), but when the jurisdictional and procedural boundaries of international law are overstepped and the most powerful States adopt unilateral coercive acts, the risk is that innocent (or merely “situationally guilty”) individuals will be targeted as well. This is especially likely in contexts of failed States and frequent regime change, where regime representatives may be targeted with sanctions for actions carried out while in power, while finding themselves on the “borderline” side immediately after – also from a generational, family, or “dynasty” standpoint. Soft law, with all its limits never to be discounted, shall fit into the regulatory toolbox as well. To exemplify, the 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Nonbinding Principles for Domestic Regulation of the Services Sector commit APEC parties to adhere to principles of transparency, independence, and “good administration” vis-à-vis inter alia the adoption of technical standards (Asian Development Bank 2022, 224). One theoretically suitable policy forum for discussion and negotiation, whose outputs can be legally binding although it is currently traversing an identity crisis, is of course the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Not only do technical standards need to abide by the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, but in terms of intellectual property (IP), for example, Article VI(4) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) demands WTO members to negotiate domestic regulation disciplines on qualification, licensing, and indeed technical standards. The TBT Agreement is of express significance here as compliance thereto is reported within most standards (applicable to digital onboarding) themselves, including privacy and cybersecurity standards ISO/IEC 27001:2022 and ISO/IEC 29100:2011. As hinted at, the WTO system is currently the site of deeply rooted institutional struggles among value- and interestdivergent “geoeconomic blocks”, not least due to frictions between the US and China, but from a legal perspective it still remains one of the very few platforms where high-level technical and policy discussions around standards can take place and result in the adoption of internationally binding measures. This might read even more promising if one considers that migrations today are tightly interconnected with human rights concerns and environmental considerations that WTO panels and diplomats tend to increasingly consider towards their adjudicatory and policymaking activities. One drawback to consider is that WTO lawmaking, too, has regrettably incorporated the general resort by international institutions to unaccountable sanctioning (Neuwirth and Svetlicinii 2015); these sanctions are directed at States, not individuals, but the latter will in any case be the ultimate effect-bearers.