CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES 173 This amendment for the first time openly declared the religious identity of migrants as a legal factor for citizenship. Secondly, unlike returning Muslims from Pakistan, Hindu migrants did not require any resettlement permits, nor was their intention to return (expressed through residence of five years) ever questioned.149 Descent-based elements had therefore considerably infiltrated the birthright principles, with religious identity no longer a matter of covert signalling.150 The current CAA-NRC debate needs to be contextualized against this historic and legislative backdrop. It is somewhat simplistic to argue that these developments are an attack on India’s “compellingly secular” Constitution.151 Instead, they solidify a trend that can be traced back to 1985 which reflects aspects of colonial citizenship and the attitudes of some members of the 1949 Constituent Assembly in regard to Muslim migrants. As Jayal remarks on the CAAs positive discrimination towards non-Muslims from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, “the silent implication is that Muslims from [the named] countries would continue to be treated as illegal immigrants and would not be therefore eligible for the same relaxation.”152 This overt emphasis conflates the characterization of a potential foreigner with a specific religious identity, legitimizing an insinuation that has been historically ingrained in the constitutional accommodation of communal nationalism and increasingly restrictive citizenship legislation. Delegitimizing the potential foreigner: Administrative violence in India and Myanmar Citizenship is actualized in Burma and India through numerous documents and bureaucratic practices.153 In India, citizenship documentation includes passports, voter cards, ration cards, bank account passbooks, and two different proofs of address establishing residency. Once an individual’s “biographical and socioeconomic characteristics are captured … they are targets for a normalized practice of citizenship. Information and artifacts generate the standard citizen, a citizen that the state engages and prefers.”154 It is important to note that the situation may challenge conventional understandings of citizenship, in which rights follow the acquisition of citizenship. In fact, a reverse ordering can also be true, as “people engage in some of the citizenship rights first, then use the documentary products of those to gain citizenship status.”155 Some people may bypass citizenship acquisition procedures and practice citizenship rights via a lease, utility bills, or a letter from a local elite. This creates a veneer of legitimacy in the eyes of the 149 These amendments were cited by the Modi administration in 2019 when it accused the Congress Party of double standards in opposing the CAA-NRC, as they themselves had backed citizenship for Pakistani Hindus in 2003. See the Times of India 2019. 150 Two other legislative changes similar to the 2019 amendments are important. The Passport Rules Act (1950) and the Orders under the Foreigners Act (1946) were both amended in 2015 to exempt members of persecuted minority religious groups in Bangladesh and Pakistan seeking shelter in India from the requirement of holding valid passports or visas. If indeed the official concern is about religious persecution, it is puzzling why similar provisions were not extended to Ahmadi or Rohingya Muslims, persecuted sects in Pakistan and Myanmar, respectively. 151 Bhat 2019. 152 Jayal 2019, 35-36. 153 Sadiq 2017b. 154 Saqiq 2017b, 168. 155 Sadiq 2009, 15; see also Lund 2020.