THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS 54 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017 [Vol. 19 international protection for refugees and stateless persons. In this regard, new normative frameworks arose simultaneously that required states to respect the enumerated rights of individuals subject to their jurisdiction and to provide protection to persons whose rights were violated by other states. This new order encroached upon many areas in which states had previously considered their authority to be sovereign and beyond reproach. In particular, the decision to include the right to nationality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), at the same time that the global community elaborated an international framework for the protection of stateless persons, marked a shift away from sovereign control of nationality. Indeed, such limitations imposed by human rights law are often viewed as antithetical to state sovereignty to the extent that they compromise on the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.29 This tension is particularly notable in the domain of nationality,30 where regulation has long been considered inherent to sovereignty.31 The following section examines the evolution of nationality as a fundamental human right, and the simultaneous development of the international legal order for the protection of stateless persons, which exists as the principal effort to consolidate global protection for the human right to nationality. This section is intended to communicate the persistent tension in the international regulation of nationality, and thereby acknowledge the perspective of states that view such regulation as an unwarranted incursion into internal affairs. A. The Evolution of Nationality as an Individual Right The Twentieth Century witnessed the rapid increase in the number of nation states, from fifty-five states in 1914 to 192 states by 2002.32 This increase was in large part the result of decolonization, when new states around the globe established their independence from European occupiers.33 In this context, the ability of nation states to define their national membership was an important aspect of their efforts to consolidate their sovereign authority. This resonated with the general notion under international law that nationality was a matter of internal law not subject to limitations by other sovereigns.34 29. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 34 (1996) (opining that “[t]he international law of human rights penetrated the state monolith beyond repair”); see also William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity: Challenging the Sovereignty Norm through Human Rights Litigation, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 261, 264-69 (2002) (tracking normative developments, such as human rights law, that have pushed back and conflicted with sovereignty norms). 30. See HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 278 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1966) (1951) (explaining that “[s]overeignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of ‘emigration, naturalization, nationality, and expulsion.”). 31. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 283-86. 32. ROBERT ROTBERG, WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2 (2003). 33. Id. 34. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 281. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529