THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS 56 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017 [Vol. 19 In its majority decision, the ICJ made citizenship a necessary but not sufficient condition for diplomatic protection, and introduced a genuine link requirement for recognition of nationality under international law.45 The ICJ held that: “nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”46 The ICJ then used the rationale that Nottebohm was not “in fact more closely connected with the population of [Liechtenstein] than with that of [Guatemala]” to find his claim to Liechtenstein nationality ineffective, and Liechtenstein without standing to sue Guatemala for violations of Nottebohm’s rights before the ICJ.47 On its face, Nottebohm appears to undercut the force of the norm that nations are free to establish rules of nationality acquisition. However, Peter Spiro has expressed a belief that the ICJ decision is “sovereignty reinforcing” for two important reasons.48 First, the decision is sovereignty reinforcing because Liechtenstein was attempting to constrain Guatemala’s discretion over national matters.49 Upholding Liechtenstein’s right to do so would mean that a state’s right to assert itself within the sovereign territory of another was only as limited as its willingness to extend nationality.50 Further, Spiro believes that Nottebohm protects sovereignty in the sense that it provides rules for the resolution of sovereign clashes vis-à-vis dual nationals with regard to diplomatic protection.51 He emphasizes a reading of Nottebohm that limits its significance to the arena of diplomatic protection, and that the decision did not “negate his status as a national” in Liechtenstein, nor did it purport to govern his status as a member of that sovereign nation.52 Whatever forms the critiques and rationalizations of Nottebohm may take, none dispute that the ICJ decision is a basic point of reference for the discourse on the evolution of nationality in the Twentieth Century. The decision should be read in the historical context of the post-war world and in conjunction with the simultaneous evolution of human rights doctrine. In 1948, the UDHR heralded a new era in the global consciousness with regard to individual rights.53 UDHR Article 15 declared that “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality,” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived (on file with author). 45. Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 26. 46. Id. at 23. 47. Id. at 23, 25-26. 48. Spiro, supra note 7, at 284. 49. Id. 50. Id. 51. Id. at 284-85. 52. Id. at 284. 53. See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/HRDay20072008/Pages/60UDHRHCStatement2008.aspx [https://perma.cc/8RK3-VZ3A]. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529