YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017] The Risk of Statelessness VOL. XIX 89 that persons were “unprotected,” then a similar risk of being either factually unprotected (refugee) or legally unprotected (stateless) would trigger protected status. Moreover, there is an efficiency consideration, inasmuch as a shared standard would capitalize on the already extensive experience of states with refugee protection,274 as well as that of international and national tribunals in adjudicating refugee relief.275 From a practical point of view, a shared standard would mean that a person seeking statelessness protection would need to demonstrate a risk of statelessness in the same manner that a refugee needs to demonstrate a risk of persecution. A sufficient risk of statelessness would lead to a conclusion that a person is stateless, just as a sufficient risk of persecution results in refugee status. While the shared standard is attractive for the reasons provided, this approach poses both legal and policy challenges that must be reconciled. The principal challenge posed by a shared standard is that the language of the relevant conventions is not analogous. The 1951 Refugee Convention protects a person as a refugee when she demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecution in her country of nationality.276 The notion of a “wellfounded fear” implicitly refers to a level of risk. Indeed, much has been written on this formulation, and some have advanced the position that this suggests a one in ten chance of persecution.277 The question is whether a 10% risk of statelessness is similarly sustainable as a standard of proof to find someone to be a stateless person protected by international law. The 1954 Convention protects a person as stateless if she is not “considered” a national under the “operation of laws” of any country. This language suggests, and the discussion above confirms, a degree of discretion in how officials “consider” requests and interpret the “operation of laws.” While this may produce uncertainty, the balance of probabilities is not as implicit in the statelessness definition as it is in the refugee definition. However, the difficulties inherent in proving statelessness support the notion that statelessness to a certainty should not be the standard.278 The question then is whether the same “reasonable degree” standard from refugee law should be applied in the statelessness context. 274. UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 (Dec. 2011) (noting in the refugee status determination context, an individual can claim a well-founded fear of persecution by establishing “to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for reasons stated in the [refugee] definition”). 275. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (finding that a well-founded fear of persecution is a 10% likelihood, based in part on the writing of international refugee law scholars). 276. 1951 Convention, supra note 74, art. 1(A)(2). 277. The United States Supreme Court, for example, considered the writings of international refugee law scholars and found that “[t]here is simply no room in the United Nations’ definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no ‘well-founded fear’ of the event happening.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440. 278. UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons, supra note 243, ¶ 91. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529