YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017] The Risk of Statelessness VOL. XIX 79 determination. It argues that the Inter-American Court’s “risk of statelessness” is analogous to de facto statelessness, which is a status unprotected under the international law of statelessness. A protracted debate in the current campaign to eradicate statelessness has recently concluded with broad acceptance that de jure—rather than de facto— statelessness is the appropriate trigger for protection under the law of statelessness. Backsliding on the commitment to de jure statelessness could chill the steadily increasing support among states for legal protection for stateless persons, which is the principal aim of the campaign described in the first section of this Article. The next sub-section outlines the steps in determining statelessness and considers the challenges inherent in this determination in the DominicanHaitian context. Highlighting the appropriate legal and factual inquiries, it lays out the ambiguities in Haitian jus sanguinis nationality law as well as the challenges faced by persons who seek nationality solutions from Haitian public authorities. Recognizing that the concerns regarding the risk of statelessness are valid, this section demonstrates how the legal and factual challenges raised by the Inter-American Court in Expelled Haitians and Dominicans can be addressed in a statelessness determination process. Finally, the last part of this Article discusses the challenge of identifying the appropriate level of risk that should trigger a finding of statelessness. In the absence of any law on point, and minimal guidance, this Article argues that a person who is more likely than not stateless should be considered a stateless person under the 1954 Convention, and thus should be protected with a grant of nationality in the place of birth as envisioned by the 1961 Convention. This recommendation accounts for important policy considerations such as the history of sovereign control over nationality as well as the tentative start to the campaign to eradicate global statelessness. Ultimately, it is animated by the universal and fundamental nature of the human right to nationality and the drastic consequences of a rule that would permit a greater chance of statelessness before the protection of nationality in the place of birth would apply. A. Avoiding the De Facto Statelessness Dilemma As the first section of this Article illustrated, the 1954 Convention defines a “stateless person” as one who is “not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law.”223 This definition is also referred to as de jure statelessness, and it stands in contrast to de facto statelessness, which generally refers to persons who are nationals under the operation of laws of some country, but who do not receive the rights and privileges of such legal status. The consensus is that states are compelled to assist de jure stateless persons under the law of statelessness, and they are merely 223. 1954 Convention, supra note 10, art. 1. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529