YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017] The Risk of Statelessness VOL. XIX 75 approached their lack of documentation as an “omission” by the Dominican Republic, and examined whether such an omission constituted a violation of the state’s human rights obligations.189 The Dominican state had argued to the Court that Victor Jean and his children were not entitled to Dominican nationality or documentation, and that they would not become stateless because they were entitled to Haitian nationality.190 The Inter-American Court considered that the state’s posture made it unnecessary “to verify factual aspects relating to the alleged obstacles to obtain documents, or the alleged ‘refusal’ of the authorities to grant these.”191 Indeed, the Jeans had made factual allegations that they were denied their right to register their children’s births and obtain identity documents.192 However, the Dominican State argued that they had no right to those documents, thereby implicitly affirming the alleged abusive actions of unnamed civil registry officials. Accordingly, the Court cut directly to the legality of the state’s position.193 The Inter-American Court began this analysis by considering the Jeans’ right to Dominican nationality under the 1955 Dominican Constitution, which was in place when Victor Jean was born, and under the 1994 Dominican Constitution, which governed at the time of his three children’s births.194 The Court acknowledged that the two constitutions included the same “in transit” exception,195 and recalled that the 2003 appeals court decision that found this exception did not encompass irregular migrants.196 The Court observed, however, that the 2004 immigration law had included irregular migrants within the “in transit” exception,197 and that this legislation had been subsequently upheld in 2005 by the Dominican Supreme Court of Justice.198 The Court noted that the Dominican Constitution itself was amended in 2010 to exclude the children of unauthorized migrants as nationals,199 and that the Constitutional Court in 2013 interpreted the provisions of every constitution dating back to 1929 in a manner consistent with the standard set forth in the 2010 Constitution.200 The Court noted that the state’s argument with regard to the alleged discriminatory effects of the broadened and retroactively applied “in transit” exception was consistent with the 2005 Supreme Court decision and the 2013 Constitutional Court decision.201 It further acknowledged that such legal developments were not discriminatory per se.202 The Court then 189. Id. ¶ 278. 190. Id. ¶ 279. 191. Id. 192. Id. at 74 n.258. 193. Id. ¶ 279. 194. Id. ¶¶ 280, 297. 195. Id. ¶ 280 196. Id. ¶ 281. 197. Id. ¶ 282. 198. Id. ¶ 283. 199. Id. ¶ 284. 200. Id. ¶¶ 285-88. 201. Id. ¶ 293. 202. Id. ¶¶ 289-92. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529