THE RISK OF STATELESSNESS 74 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. 2017 [Vol. 19 lege, automatically), to avoid a situation of statelessness at birth, pursuant to Article 20(2) of the American Convention. This obligation also applies in the hypothesis that the parents cannot (owing to the existence of [de] facto obstacles) register their children in the State of their nationality.182 By taking this step, the Court asserted two new potential violations of the right to nationality under the Convention. First, the Court introduced the idea that a state must be sure that a child born in its territory has access to another nationality before it is relieved of the obligation to extend its own, but failed to provide clarity concerning the degree of certainty required for such relief. Second, the Court established that a person could be a national under the law of another jurisdiction at birth while not being able to access that right in fact, a factor which would inform the foregoing certainty calculation. Notably, in articulating these standards, the Court relied on a set of UNHCR statelessness guidelines on state obligations under the 1961 Convention to ensure a child would not be stateless at birth.183 With regard to the equal protection of the law, the Court noted that both direct and indirect practices of discrimination are impermissible under international human rights law. Violations of this obligation may arise in cases of “indirect discrimination reflected in the disproportionate impact of laws, actions, policies or other measures that, even though their wording is or appears to be neutral, or has a general and undifferentiated scope, have negative effects on certain vulnerable groups.”184 The Court emphasized that states must “abstain from establishing discriminatory regulations or regulations that have discriminatory effects on different groups” when devising the mechanisms for granting nationality.185 Furthermore, the Court reiterated its prior conclusion that the obligation not to discriminate binds states “irrespective of a person’s migratory status, and this obligation extends to the sphere of the right to nationality.”186 In applying these standards to the victims in Expelled Dominicans and Haitians, the Court considered the situation of persons who were born in the Dominican Republic but who had never been registered as Dominican.187 Among others, the Court reviewed the situation of Victor Jean and his three children, Victoria, Natalie, and Miguel, all of whom were born in Dominican territory but were never registered or issued nationality documents and were subsequently expelled from the country.188 The Court 182. Id. ¶ 261 (emphasis in original). 183. Id. (citing UNCHR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, supra note 84, ¶ 26). 184. Id. ¶ 263 (citing Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, ¶ 234 (Oct. 24, 2012)). 185. Id. ¶ 264. 186. Id. (citing Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶¶ 155-56 (Sept. 8, 2005)). 187. See id. ¶ 126. 188. Id. ¶ 277. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3111529