Breaking the Presumption refugee statelessness determination (‘RSD’) procedures but were amended by law to include SDPs. Finally, all 23 SDP norms state that their application and procedure are conducted by the same authority that conducts RSD. Despite this, there is not a general move to unify SDP and RSD procedures into a single law. Instead, the tendency leans towards countries enacting specialised norms on SDPs to create and develop expertise on statelessness, 21 for advocacy and donation purposes. These tendencies leave statelessness with its own line of actions and indicators, distinct from migration or refugee issues. As a result, statelessness is becoming visible through SDPs, separated from the shadows of migration and asylum concepts, norms and procedures. III THE CONCEPT OF STATELESSNESS APPLICABLE TO SDP The official conceptualisation of statelessness agreed by states can be found in art 1(1) of the 1954 Convention: ‘a person not recognised as a national by any state under the operation of its law’. This is considered as de jure statelessness. 22 However, the concept of statelessness has arguably been extended; statelessness could be understood as no longer just the result of a conflict of laws, gaps or ambiguities in the normative framework. The reality of statelessness could be said to go beyond the ‘operation of law’; that is to say, the reality of statelessness goes beyond conflicting laws, gaps or ambiguities in the laws of the states in question. 23 The following situations are some examples of challenging issues in terms of identifying who is stateless. 1 A Person Holds National ID but Cannot Enjoy Full Rights Attached to Nationality This relates to persons who have the right to citizenship by law but, given different reasons (material or political), cannot effectively enjoy all or part of the rights attached to nationality. This includes the right to vote, birth registry of 21 22 23 Expert Meeting: Statelessness Determination Procedures and the Status of Stateless Persons (Summary Conclusions, UNHCR, 6–7 December 2010) (‘Geneva Conclusions’) 3. See also Good Practices Paper 2020 (n 1). Expert Meeting: The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law (Summary Conclusions, UNHCR 27–28 May 2010) 1 (‘Prato Conclusions’); Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (n 2) 5. This article will not address discussions concerning de facto statelessness, which here is considered as imperfect or ineffective nationality. That is, a person could be entitled by law to a right of nationality or they could hold a national ID card but, despite this, cannot enjoy part or all the rights attached to the right of nationality. See David Weissbrodt and Clay Collins, ‘The Human Rights of Stateless Persons’ (2006) 28(1) Human Rights Quarterly 245, cited in Hugh Massey, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series: De Facto Statelessness (Report, No LPPR/2010/01 UNHCR, April 2010) 28. ‘Since … the interpretation of the term is subject to debate, … the researchers decided, as far as possible, to avoid the use of the terms de jure and de facto stateless’. Laura van Waas, Nationality Matters: Statelessness under International Law (Intersentia 2008) 2; Prato Conclusions (n 22) 5; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on Statelessness No 1: The Definition of ‘Stateless Person’ in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, UN Doc HCR/HS/12/01 (20 February 2012) (‘Guidelines No 1’). Published in 2014, the Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (n 2) 5 [7] recommended not to differentiate between de jure or de facto statelessness, as the 1954 Convention (n 1) does not categorise either. Meaning, therefore, any situation that could cause a person become statelessness or at risk of statelessness is subject to protection. 65