to the duplication of mandates in respect of the same refugee population between UNHCR and UNRWA inside UNRWA’s areas of operation. In UNHCR’s view, this same interpretation also guides the interpretation of the provision outside UNRWA’s areas of operation. Thus, the provision ought to be interpreted in a way that reflects the complementary mandates of the two agencies, both within and outside UNRWA’s areas of operation.30 17. It would also be incorrect to read Article 1D as applying only to those persons who were Palestinian refugees in 1951.31 This would run contrary to the intentions of the Convention’s drafters, who sought to ensure continuity of protection for the specific class of persons addressed in Article 1D until their position was definitively settled, a need which continues not only for those who were Palestinian refugees in 1951, but also persons who were displaced by the 1967 conflict as well as their descendants. Moreover, it disregards the critical change effected by the 1967 Protocol, which removed the temporal limitation on the 1951 Convention, with the aim, as expressed in the Preamble, of ensuring “equal status” for “all refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951.”32 E. “Inclusion clause” of Article 1D: the protection or assistance has ceased for any reason 18. Palestinian refugees (see paragraph 8) benefit from 1951 Convention protection under Article 1D(2) when the protection or assistance of UNRWA has ceased. Read in light of its ordinary meaning, considered in context and with due regard to the object and purpose of the 1951 Convention,33 the phrase “ceased for any reason” is not to be construed restrictively. As noted in jurisprudence, exclusion from the 1951 Convention of Palestinian refugees by way of Article 1D “was intended to be conditional and temporary, not absolute and permanent.”34 19. The application of the second paragraph of Article 1D is not, however, unlimited.35 Protection under the 1951 Convention does not extend to those applicants who, being outside an UNRWA area of operation, refuse to (re-)avail themselves of the protection or assistance of UNRWA for reasons of personal convenience. 36 That said, the reasons why one has left an UNRWA area of operation (for example, for work or study purposes, or for protection reasons) is not of itself determinative. What is pivotal is whether the protection or assistance of UNRWA has ceased owing to one or more of 30 AD (Palestine), note 2 above, para. 159. The “historical” argument that Article 1D is limited only to those persons who were Palestinian refugees in 1951, accepted by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in El-Ali note 6 above, was rejected by the CJEU in Bolbol, note 2 above, paras 47-48. See also the rejection by Advocate General Sharpston, paras 62, 65-68, in her Opinion in Bolbol, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62009CC0031. 32 1967 Protocol, preamble, third paragraph, note 1 above. See also, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, note 5 above, p. 158, footnote 110. 33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31, note 7 above. 34 AD (Palestine), note 2 above, para. 99f. 35 “Mere absence from such an area or a voluntary decision to leave it cannot be regarded as cessation of assistance.”, El Kott, note 9 above, para. 59. 36 See, El Kott, note 9 above, paras 49-51 and 59-63. See also by way of analogy regarding personal convenience, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, paragraphs 6(ii)(e) and (f), note 13 above. 31 8