24 chapter one For the most part, the duties and obligations of citizenship are shaped by the parameters of membership, rights and participation. In Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (1950), English sociologist T. H. Marshall outlines his classical theory of citizenship where its associated rights are divided into three components: the civil in the eighteenth-, the political in the nineteenth-, and the social broadly assigned to the twentieth-century. The civil element involves the rights and liberties necessary for individual freedom (such as freedom of speech, opinion and thought, the right to own property, to have valid contracts, and the right to justice); the political element involves the right to participate in the exercise of political power; and the social element involves economic welfare, security and a right to a share in the social heritage of the community (Marshall 1950, 10–11). Though he holds that each of these components or parts of citizenship rights evolved in different directions and in various degrees since the seventeenth century, the trajectory of Marshall’s theory of citizenship goes in the direction of the principles of the equality of all citizens as full members of society, common possession, rule of law, majority rule, democracy and parliamentary representation, and so forth. Seen in this manner, the institution of citizenship constitutes an overarching identity cloaking all other identities to produce ‘equal’ citizen-subjects. Of course, absent from this classical model of liberal citizenship is an account of ethnicity, culture, gender and sexuality, class and religion as major sources of identity, claims and participation – all of which have complicated the existing problems of identity in increasingly globalized societies.1 That said, and for the most part, citizenship in its contemporary realization in liberal-democratic countries in North America and Europe is universalistic in that it does not recognize or accept familial, tribal and kinship ties as legitimate sources of authority, claim-making, and participation in the public sphere. Broadly speaking, citizens in most Western liberal-democratic societies are at least formally conceived as rights-­ bearing subjects who exercise their rights equally with other citizens, so that no individual or collective is legally privileged insofar as they are citizens. Though modern citizenship in Western liberal-democratic societies is certainly not always realized and practiced in this manner; and for such a study each model of citizenship ought to be contextualized because it differs heavily from state to state, the subjects of citizenship do have direct affiliation with the state and direct access to its privileges and protection 1 For more, see Turner (2009, 65–73).