the israeli incorporation regime93 Further, racial and gendered discrepancy also exists in the area of employment. According to the Industry, Trade and Labour Ministry and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2008 Arab men earned less than their Jewish counterparts for the same work and, by the same token, Arab women had significantly lower employment rates.105 In fact, while 66.6 percent of Jewish women were employed that year only 22 percent of Arab women were employed, whereas the employment figures for Arab and Jewish men were almost the same, at 67 percent and 68.8 percent respectively. Moreover, the data shows that in 2008, the average gross salary per household was also much lower for Arab citizens, standing at 8,818 NIS compared to 14,242 NIS for Jewish-Israeli households. All in all, the data indicated that the more education Arab workers have, the greater the gap is between their average monthly income and that of their Jewish counterparts. Key to the operational level of discrimination is the configuration of land.106 When it comes to land allocation, Arabs face widespread discrimination in national and regional zoning plans – the wide extent of which cannot be covered here. Suffice to say, there exists in Israel a multi-faceted framework of laws and military regulations, which have granted the state the legal authority to confiscate Palestinian land and property.107 First codified by the British Mandatory government, and later adopted by Israel, The Land Ordinance Law (1943) sanctioned the confiscation of ­private lands for “public purposes,” which was most often defined by Israel as ­serving the needs of the Jewish population. Further, Israel also adopted the Emergency Regulations left behind by the British Mandate. 105 Haim Bior, “Israeli Arabs earn less than Jews despite working longer hours, data shows,” Haaretz, February 19, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/themarker/israeli-arabs-earn -less-than-jews-despite-working-longer-hours-data-shows-1.337866. 106 Two political notions are essential to any understanding that claims to reflect the historical and current realities of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict. The first is the acknowledgment that the struggle for Palestine has always been a struggle over land, both as a space for the fruition of culture, and as a resource for communal development. Even the most liberal Zionist thinkers in the early twentieth century asserted that the colonization of Palestine has to go in two different directions: Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel and the resettlement of the Arabs in this to neighbouring Arab states. The second notion crucial to the understanding of this conflict is the realization that this struggle over territory continues today, and is not limited to Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Rather, areas with a significant Arab population within the pre-1967 borders of Israel (most significantly the Galilee and the Naqab) continue to serve as sites for what Israeli geographers and urban planners have named spatial “policies of Judaization” – which historical revisionists are now correctly starting to label ethnic cleansing (see Pappé 2006; Yiftachel 1999). 107 See COHRE and Badil, Ruling Palestine, for a more detailed account of legal land confiscation measures by the State of Israel since its inception.