C. Paulussen statelessness, but also the prohibition of discrimination, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, the right to a fair trial, remedy and reparation, and other obligations and standards set forth in international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law.18 Zooming in on the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality,19 the Principles clarify that [t]he deprivation of nationality of citizens on national security grounds is presumptively arbitrary. This presumption may only be overridden in circumstances where such deprivation is, at a minimum: […] Carried out in pursuance of a legitimate purpose; […] Provided for by law; […] Necessary; […] Proportionate; and […] In accordance with procedural safeguards.20 Zooming in even further on the element of proportionality, the Principles subsequently stipulate that this requires that [t]he immediate and long-term impact of deprivation of nationality on the rights of the individual, their family, and on society is proportionate to the legitimate purpose being pursued; […] The deprivation of nationality is the least intrusive means of achieving the stated legitimate purpose; and […] The deprivation of nationality is an effective means of achieving the stated legitimate purpose.21 Similar requirements have been brought forward in a more general way (in his model provision on consistency of counterterrorism practices with human rights and refugee law, and humanitarian law) by the first UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin. In his report Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering Terrorism, Scheinin writes that even if permissible under national law, the exercise of certain functions and powers “may never violate peremptory or non-derogable norms of international law, nor impair the essence of any human right”22 – such as the principles of non-discrimination and equality–23 and [w]here the exercise of functions and powers involves a restriction upon a human right that is capable of limitation, any such restriction should be to 18 Ibid. 19 See also Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, above note 13, pp. 43–65; and OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” within a Human Rights Framework, 2018, available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/7/393503_2.pdf, pp. 49–51. 20 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, above note 16, p. 10. 21 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 22 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Martin Scheinin: Ten Areas of Best Practices in Countering Terrorism, A/HRC/16/51, para. 16. 23 See OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), above note 19, p. 32; UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), Working Group on Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism, Basic Human Rights Reference Guide: Security Infrastructure, Updated 2nd ed., March 2014, para. 5; and UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, A/72/287, 4 August 2017, para. 47. 610