Stripping foreign fighters of their citizenship: International human rights and humanitarian law considerations Finally, the already mentioned Principles on Deprivation of Nationality as a National Security Measure clarify in Principle 9.3.2 that “[d]eprivation of nationality is likely to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, particularly where it results in statelessness”.57 As regards the deprivation itself: the Draft Commentary to the Principles, referring to the cases Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala (Inter-American Court of Human Rights)58 and Trop v. Dulles (United States Supreme Court),59 explains that the measure “may cause severe mental suffering, as the identity of the person concerned has been taken away and that person is left in a state of uncertainty.”60 In addition to the deprivation itself, measures following citizenship stripping, such as statelessness,61 could even amount to torture.62 As such, citizenship stripping is a violation not only of international human rights law, but also of international humanitarian law, such as common Article 3. This provision was applicable to several Western countries depriving their former citizens of nationality as these countries, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, were “involved in the non-international armed conflicts against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria by undertaking airstrikes as part of the international coalition led by the United States.”63 Conclusion This brief contribution has demonstrated that depriving foreign fighters of their nationality is problematic from a variety of perspectives, not only from an international human rights law point of view (in which context the measure has already been addressed before), but also from the standpoint of the International Review of the Red Cross’s main field of focus: international humanitarian law. As just mentioned, the measure in itself – which is likely to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – violates common Article 3. However, also from a more indirect standpoint the measure should not be resorted to: it clearly undermines accountability for international humanitarian law violations already committed and can engender new violations through the non-removal of the suspect from the conflict zone. One of the few positive sides of the connection between the measure and international humanitarian law is that even 57 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, above note 16, p. 14. 58 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, above note 13, p. 77: “the elements of the concept of torture […] include methods to obliterate the personality of the victim in order to attain certain objectives, such as intimidation or punishment.” 59 Ibid.: “[T]he punishment [of denaturalization is cruel and unusual as it] strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. […] In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.” Here, the Supreme Court is clearly echoing the earlier-mentioned words of Hannah Arendt. 60 Ibid. 61 It is recalled that deprivation of nationality may not lead to statelessness; see the earlier reference to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. However, in practice, this still happens, either de jure or de facto. 62 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, above note 13, p. 77. 63 Geneva Academy, RULAC, Netherlands, available at: https://www.rulac.org/browse/countries/thenetherlands. 617