RAMADAN v. MALTA JUDGMENT 13 practical steps had been taken by the authorities in order to remove the applicant from Malta. The Government referred to Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France (27 August 1992, § 46, Series A no. 241-B), in which the Court had distinguished the applicants’ case from that of the applicant in Soering v. the United Kingdom (7 July 1989, Series A no. 161), since in the former case no expulsion order had been made in respect of the applicants. They explained that deprivation of Maltese citizenship did not mean that the person so deprived would be removed from Malta. In order for the person to be removed from Malta, a removal order would have to be issued. Such an order had not been issued in the case of the applicant in the present case. 52. The applicant submitted that he was a victim under Article 34 of the Convention, since the revocation of his Maltese citizenship threatened the very basis of his ability to reside in Malta. He was directly affected by the impugned measure, in line with the Court’s case-law. In this connection, he referred to Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland (28 March 1990, § 47, Series A no. 173). The applicant submitted that even though a deportation or removal order was not in force, the threat of such an order was imminent. Indeed, the Government had not stated that a deportation or removal order would not be issued and had expressed the view that following the annulment of his first marriage, “the applicant’s stay in Malta was precarious”. It was probable that no such action had been taken by the authorities only because they had been informed that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no further steps were to be taken. The applicant submitted that once the Maltese Government had accepted that he could establish his second family in Malta, as he had in fact done, any subsequent curtailment of his status in Malta would directly affect that family life. (b) The Court’s assessment 53. The Court reiterates that the word “victim” in the context of Article 34 of the Convention denotes a person directly affected by the act or omission in issue (see, among many other authorities, Nsona v. the Netherlands, 28 November 1996, § 106, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V, and Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 50, ECHR 1999-VII). In other words, the person concerned must be directly affected by it or run the risk of being directly affected by it (see, for example, Norris v. Ireland, 26 October 1988, §§ 30-31, Series A no. 142, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, § 39, Series A no. 295-A). It is not therefore possible to claim to be a “victim” of an act which is deprived, temporarily or permanently, of any legal effect (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, § 92, ECHR 2007-I). With reference to the specific category of cases involving the deportation of non-nationals, the Court has consistently held that an applicant cannot claim to be the “victim” of a deportation measure if the