34 ANDREJEVA v. LATVIA JUDGMENT filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service, with a view to influencing the court’s decision (see, for example, J.J. v. the Netherlands, 27 March 1998, § 43, Reports 1998-II, and Quadrelli v. Italy, no. 28168/95, § 34, 11 January 2000). 97. The Court further reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention does not compel the Contracting States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation. However, where such courts do exist, the proceedings before them must comply with the guarantees of Article 6, for instance in that it guarantees to litigants an effective right of access to the courts for the determination of their civil rights and obligations (see Levages Prestations Services v. France, 23 October 1996, § 44, Reports 1996-V, and Annoni di Gussola and Others v. France, nos. 31819/96 and 33293/96, § 54, ECHR 2000-XI). 98. Lastly, the Court would reiterate that like all the other substantive provisions of the Convention, Article 6 § 1 is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective (see Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37). This is particularly relevant with regard to Article 6 § 1, in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial (see Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany [GC], no. 42527/98, § 45, ECHR 2001-VIII). It must also be borne in mind that hindrance can contravene the Convention just like a legal impediment (see Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, § 25, Series A no. 32). 99. In the instant case it is undisputed that the domestic law – more specifically, section 471 of the Civil Procedure Act – guaranteed the applicant the right to take part in the public hearing before the Senate of the Supreme Court (see paragraph 40 above). Nevertheless, she was unable to exercise that right, not because of any negligence on her own part but because the Senate had decided to hold a hearing earlier than scheduled. In this connection, the Court has frequently held that procedural rules are designed to ensure the proper administration of justice and compliance with the principle of legal certainty, and that litigants must be entitled to expect those rules to be applied (see, among other authorities, Cañete de Goñi, cited above, § 36; Gorou v. Greece (no. 3), no. 21845/03, § 27, 22 June 2006; and Miholapa v. Latvia, no. 61655/00, § 24, 31 May 2007). This principle applies both ways, not only in respect of litigants but also in respect of the national courts. 100. The Court notes that the appeal on points of law was lodged not by the applicant herself or by her lawyer but by the public prosecutor attached to the Riga Regional Court, in accordance with section 90 of the Civil Procedure Act. The Government argued that in this particular case, the favourable position adopted by the public prosecutor had dispensed the Senate from having to afford the applicant the opportunity to attend the hearing herself. The Court is not persuaded by that argument. It is true that section 90 of the Civil Procedure Act empowers the public prosecutor to perform certain procedural steps on a party’s behalf, and section 2 of the