SAHNI ARTICLE 3.3.21 (WORD) (DO NOT DELETE) 130 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 5/6/2021 7:21 PM Vol. 24:2 In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has expanded the due process rights of stateless applicants. The European Convention of Human Rights168 (ECHR) lacks a right to nationality clause, but the Court compensates for the defect by citing Article 8. Article 8(1) guarantees the rights to respect for an individual’s home and private life.169 Article 8(2) limits state interference with these prerogatives.170 The Court relies upon these grounds to justify that a stateless person may incur a right of ongoing residence in an EU state and avoid deportation. Article 8171 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In Hoti v. Croatia, the EctHR declared that the State has a positive obligation under Article 8 to provide a fair administrative and judicial The High Court did not encourage the applicant to seek Indian nationality as a priority or sole option. India does not permit dual nationality. Surprisingly, the High Court focused on the child’s present status as a stateless person and not on the very tangible possibility that the statelessness status could be reversed in the past, present, and future. It applied a strict interpretation of ¶ 3(1)(a) to find that applicant “is and always has been stateless.” From this rigidly literal interpretation, the High Court then took an extremely liberal and expansive stance. It dismissed the fact that the applicant could register as an Indian citizen if her parents chose to do so on her behalf. The reality was that the applicant was stateless at the present time, and it was irrelevant if the applicant had the ability to acquire a nationality. Furthermore, the High Court observed optimistically that the parents could benefit if the child secured British nationality. “I recognise of course that this conclusion opens an obvious route to abuse. Indeed, the facts of the present case might be said to be an example of abuse. M and F are both overstayers. Both have sought, and been refused, further leave. They have preferred to allow C to be stateless all her life to date rather than to register her birth and obtain Indian nationality for her. Yet C’s right to British nationality (and the consequence that she will not be or become a national of India) will now immeasurably improve M and F’s prospects of being allowed to stay in the United Kingdom. But the Secretary of State’s position in this case on the one hand, and the authorities on the other, necessarily lead to this result.” (¶ 37). Perhaps the High Court’s reasoning was motivated by respect for the Applicant’s rights to private and family life and her home under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)? This would conflict, though, with the High Court’s dismissal of Article 8 earlier in the judgment (¶ 42). 168. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 169. Id. at art. 8(1). 170. Id. at art. 8(2). 171. Id. at art. 8.