533US2 706 Unit: $U87 [10-21-02 18:35:10] PAGES PGT: OPIN ZADVYDAS v. DAVIS Kennedy, J., dissenting edged, may be a significant one in some later case; but it ought not to drive us to an incorrect interpretation of the statute. The Court having reached the wrong result for the wrong reason, this respectful dissent is required. I The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V), is straightforward enough. It provides: “An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in paragraph (3).” 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V). By this statute, Congress confers upon the Attorney General discretion to detain an alien ordered removed. It gives express authorization to detain “beyond the removal period.” Ibid. The class of removed aliens detainable under the section includes aliens who were inadmissible and aliens subject to final orders of removal, provided they are a risk to the community or likely to flee. The issue to be determined is whether the authorization to detain beyond the removal period is subject to the implied, nontextual limitation that the detention be no longer than reasonably necessary to effect removal to another country. The majority invokes the canon of constitutional doubt to read that implied term into the statute. One can accept the premise that a substantial constitutional question is presented by the prospect of lengthy, even unending, detention in some instances; but the statutory construction the Court adopts should be rejected in any event. The interpretation has no basis in the lan-