Sudita Keita v Hungary an examination of how the law operates and is a mixed question of fact and law. 33 When Nigeria confirmed that, according to the operation of its law, Mr Keita was not a national, the applicant should have been recognised as stateless without any further qualification. The term de facto statelessness is absent from the 1954 Convention and not defined anywhere in international law. 34 Its application may lead to the exclusion from protection of persons who should fall within the scope of the 1954 Convention, a dangerous approach that the Court should clarify in future jurisprudence. In using the words ‛rendering the applicant de facto stateless’, the Court also disregarded the declaratory nature of the recognition of statelessness, as an individual is considered stateless from the moment that the conditions under art 1(1) of the 1954 Convention are met. 35 In the examination of whether the domestic authorities complied with their positive obligations under art 8, the Court followed the same principles in Sudita Keita and Hoti, 36 suggesting a consistent reasoning for similar cases: assessing the applicant’s social ties to the country, 37 establishing that the uncertainty had adverse repercussions on private life, 38 examining whether there was an effective possibility of regularising legal status 39 and, finally, whether any requirements were imposed that the applicant was unable to fulfil by virtue of his status. 40 In the assessment of the repercussions on the private life of the applicant, although Mr Keita had complained of the impact on his access to healthcare, employment and inability to marry, the Court focused only on the first two items and did not address the relevance of the right to marry in this context. CONCLUSION The judgment reinforces that the rights protected under the ECHR are not merely theoretical, but must be practical and effective. 41 Although Hungary had an established statelessness determination procedure, until 2015 it was only accessible to those lawfully staying in the country and, thus, prevented stateless people from effectively accessing protection. The Constitutional Court of Hungary’s decision of February 2015 brought the Hungarian procedure into compliance with international norms, and the Court’s judgment in Sudita Keita reiterated that it is contrary to the principles of the 1954 Convention to impose on stateless individuals requirements that they are unable to fulfil. 42 Such 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (n 28) [7], [23]–[24]. 1954 Convention (n 4) art 1(1) states that, for the purposes of the Convention, the term ‘stateless person’ means a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law. The UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons explains that the determination of a person’s statelessness requires an analysis of how nationality laws are applied in practice by the state in relation to the individual, ie how the law operates. Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (n 28) [7]. For a discussion on this point, see Expert Meeting - The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law (“Prato Conclusions”) (UNHCR 2010) <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ca1ae002.html> Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons (n 28) [16]; Sudita Keita (n 1) [38]. Although with a different outcome, see also the similarities with Abuhmaid (n 23). Sudita Keita (n 1) [33]; Hoti (n 5) [125]. Sudita Keita (n 1) [34]; Hoti (n 5) [126]. Sudita Keita (n 1) [36]; Hoti (n 5) [131]. Sudita Keita (n 1) [39]; Hoti (n 5) [137]. Airey v Ireland (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 6289/73, 9 October 1979) [24]; Artico v Italy (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 6694/74, 13 May 1980) [33]. Sudita Keita (n 1) [39]. 329