24 Lucia M. Rafanelli collective self-determination)—and that this would require reforming the existing migration policy regime, especially the regime of refugee policy.109 Stilz argues that states have ‘morally binding, enforceable’ duties to avoid frustrating ‘outsiders’ fundamental territorial interests’ (roughly, their interests in being able to occupy and use land to pursue their life projects).110 This requires admitting refugees, by which Stilz means anyone whose fundamental territorial interests are unfulfiled in their home country.111 Stilz argues that states’ enforceable duties should be enforced using a strategy whereby states voluntarily bind themselves and bind each other to fulfil their duties, ensuring all refugees are admitted to some state where their occupancy rights and self-determination are protected and where they enjoy basic justice. Specifically, Stilz says, states should bind themselves via treaty and bind each other by threatening to revoke the benefits of international cooperation from other states that do not sign or honour the terms of the relevant treaties.112 While I share Stilz’s scepticism about whether states are entitled to the full discretion over membership the state system currently assigns them,113 I believe her allegiance to a statist model of world order limits the extent to which her arguments can show us the way to full justice—especially for stateless people. As indicated above, I understand the existing state system to be organised around the Political Authority Principle (since states are the world’s primary political authorities, reliable access to basic needs fulfilment, rights protection, and political enfranchisement is conditioned on state membership) and the Sovereignty Principle (because they are sovereign, states may grant or deny membership at will). Stilz, reasonably, argues we should reject the Sovereignty Principle, but she presents this as a friendly amendment to the state system, rather than a radical challenge to it. She explicitly describes her view as a ‘reformist account of territorial sovereignty’,114 contrasting it with a ‘more radical[] strand of cosmopolitanism that places the normative presuppositions of the modern state system into question’.115 However, I would argue that to reject the Sovereignty Principle is precisely to reject a key ‘normative presupposition[] of the modern state system’.116 Thus, if Stilz really does want us to reject the Sovereignty Principle, then her view calls for a more radical change to the core organising principles of the state system than she admits. But if this true, it is not clear that we can or should rely on states and statist institutions to bring about the required change—as Stilz suggests we should. At the very least, there is a danger in overreliance on statist institutions that Stilz doesn’t seem to recognise. As I argued above, there is good reason to think that channelling political activity through statist institutions will entrench the existing state system, around whose structure they are designed. This suggests we should not rely on statist institutions as the 109 Stilz 2019. Ibid., 251, emphasis in the original. 111 Ibid., 157–86, 251–2. 112 Ibid., 219–48. 113 Ibid., 12–3. 114 Ibid., 15, emphasis in the original. 115 Ibid., 17. I have not argued that all boundaries or political memberships are morally arbitrary, which is the view Stilz (2019, 17) attributes to the ‘radical’ cosmopolitans. However, I have argued that the basic organising structure of the state system is ill-equipped to achieve full justice and should be challenged. 116 Stilz 2019, 17. 110 https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press