International Theory 11 depends upon some entities (states) having the power to make people stateless (to deny them political representation, basic needs fulfilment, and rights protections by denying them state membership). Thus, the current structure of the state system creates both statelessness and a perpetual vulnerability to statelessness even among people who presently enjoy state memberships. It creates statelessness by making it the case that some people are denied reliable access to basic needs fulfilment, basic rights protections, and political enfranchisement because they are denied state membership. And it creates perpetual vulnerability to this condition by granting states the discretionary right to deny membership—which, given the organisation of the state system around the Political Authority Principle, brings with it a denial of reliable access to these same goods and protections. One could imagine alternate institutions that did not attach enfranchisement, needs fulfilment, and rights protection so firmly to state membership or did not give states the power to deny it at will. This leaves open the question of what alternate institutional arrangements we should prefer. I have suggested that, to adequately address the issue of statelessness, the international system should not be organised around the Political Authority and Sovereignty Principles; we should abandon at least one of these principles. But there are many possible institutional arrangements that would meet this standard. One option, of course, would be the complete abolition of the state in favour of an anarchic system. But this is not the only option, and nothing I’ve said here entails it is the one we should pursue. Instead, one could imagine a world of open borders, as Carens advocates, where people are guaranteed the freedom to settle in any state of their choosing55— combined with an additional guarantee that they would enjoy membership wherever they settled. This would revoke states’ discretion over their membership, a clear rejection of the Sovereignty Principle. In a world like this, states might still be powerful political actors and the Political Authority Principle might remain in place, attaching important benefits and protections to state membership. But states would not be entitled to deny or revoke membership—and individuals would have greater power to determine their own membership by settling where they preferred. Alternatively, imagine establishing political institutions in which stateless people were formally enfranchised and guaranteed the protections that (today) typically require state membership. Siegelberg discusses one such arrangement proposed to accommodate stateless people after World War II, which would have ‘create[d] an extranational citizenship sponsored by the United Nations such that the stateless would become the first world citizens.’56 This reform alone wouldn’t challenge the Sovereignty Principle, as states could retain discretion over their membership. But it would constitute a clear departure from the Political Authority Principle, as there would be another way for stateless people to reliably access the needs fulfilment, rights protections, and political enfranchisement that currently depend on state membership. One could also imagine strengthening international institutions to more significantly limit states’ sovereign discretion. For example, Arendt briefly endorsed the idea of a European federation of nations where political community and territorial sovereignty need not be so tightly connected as they are in the standard Westphalian 55 56 Carens 2013, 225–54. Siegelberg 2020, 174. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297192500003X Published online by Cambridge University Press