permission to work or access services. This lack of legal status, combined with a lack of citizenship in Myanmar, leaves them vulnerable to both indefinite detention and refoulement.6 Unable to obtain travel documents, different generations of stateless Rohingyas often have no other options open to them but to travel irregularly through networks of brokers, which can expose them to the risks of abuse and exploitation in transit and in the destination country. Unable to obtain visas or work permits, they are forced to work in the informal economy and often need to secure work through informal networks and consortiums. They often end up in unregulated, low status jobs where they can encounter unsafe working conditions, unpaid wages, and other forms of labour exploitation. Additionally, a lack of legal status leaves them excluded from formal banking and financial systems, making them dependent on informal and unregulated money lenders and transfer systems that leave them vulnerable to exploitation, extortion and abuse.7 8. The vast majority of Rohingya children born into situations of protracted displacement outside Myanmar are unable to access formal education or training. With socioeconomic pressures on households, children are often required to contribute to household income by working in often unsafe conditions. Socio-economic pressures combined with demographic change due to sustained forced migration of young men from Myanmar, and dowry systems changed by social upheaval, also contribute to incidents of early (child) marriage, and trafficking in girls across international borders. For example, from ISI’s research Rohingya women and girls attempt the journey to Malaysia from Myanmar and Bangladesh, for the purposes of marriage, to join other family members, and/or to access income earning opportunities.8 9. Since the mass exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh in 2017, more restrictions on movement and livelihoods have been placed on Rohingyas living in the camps of Bangladesh. The presence of cross-border armed gangs, including but not limited to ARSA, have increased violence in the camps. This includes frequent shootings and gun battles, assassinations, arson, abductions and enforced disappearances. These insecurities and deteriorating living conditions in Bangladesh cause Rohingyas to take onwards journeys. As such both Myanmar and Bangladesh are source countries for smuggling and trafficking of Rohingyas. 10. There are currently two main routes from Bangladesh and Myanmar to other countries of Southeast Asia and beyond: by boat across the Andaman Sea to Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere; and by land through Myanmar, across the Myanmar-Thai border and onwards to Malaysia and elsewhere. According to UNHCR, more than 3,500 Rohingyas attempted sea crossings in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in 2022. This figure represents a 360 per cent increase and signals increasing desperation compared to 2021 when around 700 individuals made similar journeys. Regarding the death toll, around 348 individuals are believed to have died or gone missing at sea making 2022 one of the deadliest years since 2014. Nearly 45 per cent of those rescued were women and children.9 6 Supra note 3, See also: Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, Failure to Protect: The Denial Of Status, Detention and Refoulement of Rohingya Refugees in India, 2021, Available at: https://files.institutesi.org/Rohingya_Refugees_in_India_Brieifing_Paper.pdf [accessed 28 February 2023] 7 Supra note 3 8 See more on the Gendered Drivers of Forced Migration in supra note 2 9 UNHCR, Protection at Sea in South East Asia - 2022 in Review, 2023, Available at: https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/98170#_ga=2.182629350.197735219.1677585555-819883162.1668779857, [accessed 28 February 2023] 2