The Grimshaw Review of International Affairs Vol. 2, No. 1 collapse, the state – under both the military and the NLD – found in the Rohingya a convenient scapegoat (International Crisis Group, 2021). The securitisation of the Rohingya as existential threats to national identity and border integrity allowed the regime to consolidate domestic support through fear and nationalism (Passeri, 2021, p. 227). As Bi (2018) argues, ethnic violence surged during the democratic transition because the Tatmadaw needed such conflict to remain politically relevant, while civilian leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi – wary of estranging a nationalist electorate – tacitly complied. The result was a convergence of domestic political interests – authoritarian and electoral – around the systematic persecution of a stateless people. In this light, the Rohingya crisis cannot be understood in isolation; it is both a symptom and consequence of Myanmar’s fractured political order and the enduring logic of militarised ethno-nationalism. Thus far, the international response to the Rohingya’s plight has largely been defined by humanitarian assistance, political condemnation, and diplomatic stasis. Major regional powers, particularly China and India, have played a predominant role in complicating efforts to hold Myanmar accountable. China has repeatedly blocked resolutions in the United Nations Security Council, using its veto power to obstruct international attempts to address the ongoing violations against the Rohingya, thereby protecting its strategic ties with Myanmar (Ismail & Dolan-Evans, 2017). Meanwhile, India has strengthened its military relationship with Myanmar to counter China’s rise, and has announced plans to deport tens of thousands of Rohingya refugees from its own territory (Ismail & Dolan-Evans, 2017). Even Bangladesh – having long been a place of refuge for the Rohingya – has recently begun pushing refugees back into Myanmar, violating the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of individuals to places where they would face persecution (Wade, 2017). Furthermore, the international community has largely deferred diplomatic responsibility to ASEAN, a Southeast Asian regional body ultimately constrained by internal divisions and its foundational commitment to non-interference (Epstein, 2024). Although ASEAN attempted to take a leading role after Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the implementation of its five-point consensus faltered almost immediately amid a lack of cooperation from the junta, and even 8