614. 8 U.S.C. § 1503. See, e.g., Forbes v. I.N.S., 2001 WL 869646 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (concluding that a claim of derivative citizenship in the context of deportation proceedings arises under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the federal habeas statute). 615. Compare N-400 leading to naturalization certificate and N-600 leading to certificate of citizenship for U.S. citizens by birth on account of jus sanguinis (birth abroad to U.S. citizen parent). 8 U.S.C. § 1433. 616. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b). 617. On availability of a writ of habeas corpus, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration law and Federal Court Jurisdiction through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 459, 484 (2006), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google. com/&httpsredir=1&article=3019&context=clr (“Since the 1960s, it has been well settled that a final removal order against a noncitizen satisfies the threshold requirement that he be ‘in custody’ before he may file a habeas petition. It is also well settled that the departure of a noncitizen who has filed a habeas petition challenging a final removal order does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Put more generally, the in-custody requirement must be satisfied only at the time the petition is filed. If a noncitizen leaves the United States before filing a habeas petition, however, the general rule says that it is too late to do so because the noncitizen will no longer be able to satisfy the in-custody requirement.”). The availability of habeas to claimants outside the United States but without a final order of removal or seeking admission, e.g. pursuant to § 1503 (c), hinges on the interpretation of the “in custody” requirement. The argument in favor of jurisdiction in “non-detained” cases without a final removal order may be grounded, for example, in the fundamental right of a citizen to return to his country. See Elizabeth Brodyaga, Mexican-Americans and the Southern Border: So You Think You Were Born Here? Prove It!!, 17-06 Immigr. Briefings 1 (June 2017) (citing Worthy v. United States). 618. Hinojosa et al. v. Horn et al., 896 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2018). 619. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, Hinojosa et al. v. Horn et al. (Oct. 8, 2018). 620. Claims of citizenship arise in two principle postures: (1) affirmative cases seeking declaratory judgments of citizenship and (2) defenses to removal by respondents in immigration courts. In the latter scenario, immigration judge (IJ) decisions are reviewed by the Board of Immigration Appeals under the authority of the Attorney General (BIA) (8 C.F.R.§ 1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2019)). BIA precedent is binding unless it is contradicted by Supreme Court or federal circuit court decisions. See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I&N Dec. 25, 31-32 (BIA 1989). Neither IJs nor the BIA will be bound by a federal district court decision. Matter of K- S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715, 718 (BIA 1993). 621. Castelano et al. v. Clinton, 2d Amend. Compl., U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. Tex., 08-cv-57, at para. 35. Endnotes 622. Anthony D. Bianco, Michael A. Celone & Sherease Pratt, Defending Agency Immigration Fraud Adjudications, in 65 U.S. Attorneys’ Bulletin (July 2017), at 90, https://www. justice.gov/usao/page/file/984701/download (citing De Vargas v. Brownell, 251 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1958) (burden of proof is on the claimant to prove that she is an American citizen); Reyes v. Neely, 264 F.2d 673, 678 (5th Cir. 1959) (providing that the burden of proving citizenship is a preponderance of the evidence standard)). 623. De Vargas v. Brownell, 251 F.2d 869, 871 (5th Cir. 1958)), and the burden of proving citizenship is a preponderance of the evidence standard (see Reyes v. Neely, 264 F.2d 673, 678 (5th Circ. 1959)). 624. See, e.g., Elizabeth Brodyega, Mexican-Americans and the Southern Border: So You Think You Were Born Here? Prove It!!, 17-06 Immigr. Briefings 1 (June 2017). 625. L. Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017). See also Chacoty v. Tillerson, 285 F. Supp. 3d 293, 298 (D.D.C. 2018) (“An aggrieved party seeking to take advantage of § 1503 must take one of two paths. If she is “within the United States,” § 1503(a) creates a cause of action allowing her to seek a declaration that she is a U.S. national. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). She need only make “a prima facie case establishing [her] citizenship.” The government must then produce ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence to rebut her showing”) (citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 47 n.2 (1967)) (internal citation omitted). 626. See Campbell v. Sessions, 737 F. App’x 599, 601 (2d Cir. 2018); Delmore v. Brownell, 236 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1959); Olivas v. Salazar, 743 F. App’x 890, 890 (9th Cir. 2018); Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Wing Ying Gee v. Kennedy, 214 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D. Minn. 1963). 627. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 47 n.2 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 628. United States v. Ghaloub, 385 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1966). 629. See 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). Section 1252 provides for exclusive jurisdiction for federal circuit courts of appeal to review final orders of removal 630. Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 42 (2009). 631. See, e.g., Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 419–20 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying a burden-shifting framework in which the government presents evidence of alienage, the petitioner responds with substantial credible evidence of citizenship, and then the burden shifts back to the government to prove alienage by clear and convincing evidence); Lee Hon Lung v. Dulles, 261 F.2d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 1958) (“[W] here one has, over a long period of years, acted in reliance upon a decision . . . admitting him as a citizen of the United States, the fraud or error which will warrant disregard of such decision must be established by evidence which is clear, unequivocal, and convincing.”). In reality, “in expedited removal proceedings, there is at best only a very limited opportunity to prove U.S. citizenship if the Customs and 189