Citizenship revocation and statelessness of Kurds in Syria and marginalisation of those groups of Kurdish had been passed on to their children, resulting in multiple generations of stateless people. As Syrian mothers cannot pass on their nationality to their children on an equal basis with fathers, 23 the lack of access to civil registration and barriers to registering vital civil status have increased the number of stateless Kurds. As a result of natural population growth, the number of stateless Kurds (both foreigners and Maktoums) reached at least 300,000 by 2011,24 representing around 15% of the SyrianKurdish population. Other estimates by local Kurdish civil groups say that there were more like 500,000 Kurdish non-citizens in Syria. According to several Syrian NGOs,25 those with stateless status were registered with the local administration offices in the neighbourhoods and cities of the governorate and were given only a document proving their affiliation with the category of ‘foreigners of Al-Hassaka’ or ‘unregistered’.26 As children inherit their statuses from their parents, over time Kurdish stateless families lost all civil rights, including identity, health, education, work, property and land ownership, and access to basic services. These injustices against Kurdish identity were a milestone in the history of the relationship between the ruling regime in Damascus and the Kurds in the north and northeast of the country. As a result of the economic and social exclusion of the first generation, the very restrictive ethnic approach and racial discrimination policies continued severely on the families of stateless Kurds of Jazira, and several forms of suffering and discrimination were imposed, including: inability to access other livelihoods, labour and job opportunities, prohibitions of Kurdish festivities and traditional clothes, and restrictions on internal travel to other Syrian provinces or governorates, as well as denial of passports and internationally recognised travel documents. Due to the high birth rate of Kurdish families, the number of ‘unregistered’ has grown rapidly over the years. Despite the limited figures and information on the ‘unregistered’, the situation of this group has been even more tenuous than the ‘foreigners’, because they are denied identity cards, are not listed in official population registers, and have no access to any services or civil rights. According to documents shared by HRW in 1996, two European embassies estimated the number of ‘unregistered’ at 22,000 in 1994. But it appeared that the number was significantly higher. According to HRW, the Syrian government indicated that, in addition to the Kurds classified as ‘foreigners’, more aliens infiltrated into Syria after the 1962 official census. As stated in the report, the Syrian government answered that: “No census of these persons has been conducted, but their number was estimated to be approximately 60,000 in 1985 and has risen to about 75,000 in 1995.”27 Among stateless Kurds (both ‘foreigners’ and ‘unregistered’), the next generations faced even more severe challenges during the 1980s and 1990s. More severely on livelihoods and economic rights, under the Assad regime, Kurds were not allowed to work as taxi drivers - as they could not get a driving license. As they had less freedom of movement to travel within Syria, stateless Kurds faced problems with finding jobs, applying to grants or assistances, and owning a business. Importantly, stateless Kurds were not allowed to own houses under their own names. The ‘foreigners’ were allowed to travel or could pay bribes to get access to some public services (hospital and schools), but were not allowed to work in restaurants and hotels, or entitled to rent homes, apartments and hotel rooms in any provinces. 23 Legislative Decree 276 - Nationality Law [Syrian Arab Republic], Legislative Decree 276, 24 November 1969, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d81e7b12.html [accessed 29 September 2020] 24 Rudaw (2011), Documentary on the Non-Citizens Kurds of Syria. Available at: https://bit.ly/3iEuDIC 25 For more details and testimonials, please see: Syrians for Truth and Justice (2019), ‘Al-Hasakah Census 1962’. Available at: https://stj-sy.org/en/tag/al-Hasakah-Census-1962/ 26 Syrians for Truth and Justice (2018), ‘Syrian Citizenship Disappeared: How the 1962 Census destroyed stateless Kurds’ lives and identities’, 7. Available at: https://www.stj-sy.com/en/view/745. This report gives a detailed background to the political situation in Syria prior to the 1962 census. 27 Human Rights Watch (1996), Syria: The Silenced Kurds, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/SYRIA96.pdf, 35. European University Institute 9