Broadening the lens on citizenship revocation and the security of citizenship Iseult Honohan The value of legal citizenship is that it provides a secure status protecting its holders and making them equal members of a political community. Despite suggestions that contemporary citizenship is less important than the individual elements of the diverse bundle of rights hitherto associated with it, that it is less significant than more widely held human rights, or that it has been hollowed out by the increasing powers of states, the continuing importance of citizenship is confirmed by the case studies considered here. Citizenship is the most secure basis for an unconditional right to continuing residence in (and reentry to) the state, and for rights to participate in national representative politics, as well as more a secure exercise of other rights. From a normative perspective, the status of citizen can be seen as essential to those who are subject to the continuing authority of a state, who need institutional protection from other groups and individuals, both within and outside the state, and from the powers of the state itself. Provisions for involuntary loss of citizenship The way in which the rules regulating the acquisition and loss of citizenship are asymmetric emphasises the importance of security of citizenship. The conditions under which states revoke it have tended to be more constrained than those they require for its initial acquisition. Most states have some legal provisions for the involuntary loss of citizenship. In general these can be seen as based on two different kinds of grounds: either confirming the loss of substantial links with the country (such as by long-term residence abroad or acquiring another citizenship), or applying a penalty for specific behaviour (such as fraud in acquiring citizenship, political or other serious crimes, or disloyalty to the state or constitution). Many provisions of the second kind apply only to naturalised citizens, not to those who acquired their citizenship at birth. While states have the right to define their own membership, there are some constraints in international law, including an individual’s right not to be arbitrarily deprived of their citizenship in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15.2. In addition, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article 8, prohibits withdrawal if it renders a person stateless (with possible exceptions in cases of fraudulent acquisition), and Article 9 prohibits withdrawal on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds. While it may be not fully clear what counts as unjustifiably ‘arbitrary’ procedures, De Groot and Vink have suggested that these might be understood at least as those that: are not based in law, extend loss retroactively, or are based on provisions that are not easily accessible, comprehensible and predictable. Provisions should not be discriminatory, should be challengeable in court and only in cases of fraud should withdrawal be allowed to create statelessness.1 In recent years Western states, including Netherlands, UK and Australia, have increasingly exercised and extended powers to revoke citizenship. These have largely focused on specific behaviour of individuals in carrying out or supporting terrorist activities. Some have relied on more general grounds, for example, if a person’s citizenship is deemed to be prejudicial to the national interest or the public good. Those whose citizenship is revoked on these grounds are often then subject to deportation or, if abroad, excluded from the state. The numbers involved have been small but growing, and the practice may be seen as politically and normatively problematic. While states have generally observed a limit in  1 University College Dublin. De Groot, G.-R. and M. Vink (2014), ‘A Comparative Analysis of Regulations on Involuntary Loss of Nationality in the European Union’, Background paper ILEC-project (project on Involuntary Loss of European Citizenship), CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 75. 1