Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/01 such provisions of the 1982 Citizenship Law was that after three generations the ‘others’ would integrate in the Myanmar society and thus become full citizens. 3. Uneven application leading to statelessness In order to implement the 1982 Law, Myanmar undertook, starting in 1989, a ‘national verification’ process to determine the citizenship status of its inhabitants and provided them with a color-coded ID-Card: pink means full citizenship, green naturalised citizenship and blue associate citizenship. While the 1982 law sought to create second-class citizens, not stateless persons in Rakhine, an uneven application of the law had statelessness as a consequence. Persons holding National Registration Cards proving citizenship were not given full citizenship even though they were legally entitled to it.22 Moreover, the communities refused to participate in a process which denied their right to identify themselves as they wished and identified them as ‘Bengali’ (in practice, foreigners). The Muslim community argued that they were already citizens and refused to participate in the ‘national verification process’ unless their self-identifier was included in their ID Cards. However, the policy in Rakhine State and elsewhere has been to deny such option while offering to provide temporary documentation with unclear legal status (first Temporary White Cards, more recently Interim Cards for National Verification) pending a decision on ‘citizenship scrutiny’. 4. The need for reform Leaving aside Rakhine, all applicants need to prove their belonging to the national groups through a highly bureaucratic process which often does not takes place due to the difficulties in accessing governmental services in an underdeveloped rural scenario. Access to citizenship (and equal treatment and opportunities) for many other Myanmar inhabitants is a distant dream. The discrepancy between the current legal framework and society’s needs in modern Myanmar is apparent when looking at the result of the 2014 census: 11,000,207 persons lack adequate identification documents.23 This situation results in persons being vulnerable to discrimination and in the worst cases either stateless or at the risk of statelessness. In fact, this is the reality of a considerable number of displaced persons in Myanmar and its refugees in other countries. The need for reform is indeed obvious and the only reason it does not take place is out of fear of the far right religious groups, which are highly effective in vetoing liberalising reforms (in Myanmar and elsewhere) and the position of the Army, which thanks to the 2008 Constitution hold the key to any substantial reform.24 A more normal framework concerning access to citizenship would help guide Myanmar in its democratic transition. This would mean a set of transparent and accountable norms on citizenship acquisition and loss, based on the notion of equal rights and the idea that all those who have a genuine link with and a stake in the future of the state have a moral claim to be recognised as its citizens and to be represented in democratic self-government. The law and its procedures are become anachronistic in light of the rapid changes that Myanmar is undergoing. A paper-based system sits awkwardly in the digital age. Moreover, it does not reflect the democratic principles which should guide today’s Myanmar but rather the military regime it was born under. 22 According to Article 6 of the 1982 Citizenship Law, persons who were citizens at the time of the entry into force continue to be citizens. 23 2014 Myanmar Housing and Population Census, The Union Report, page 207. 24 Aleksandra Maatsch, Ethnic Citizenship Regimes, Europeanisation, Post-war Migration and Redressing Past Wrongs, (Palgrave Macmillian, 2011), p. 24. 4