SAVICKIS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS system based on shared responsibility. We agree also that the pension legislation adopted in 1995 cannot be dissociated from the wider context of the constitutional and international law arrangements made after Latvia regained its independence in 1991 (see also Slivenko, cited above, § 111, in relation to the expulsion of former Soviet citizens). However, we do not consider that the majority have justified why the Court should reduce the intensity of its scrutiny in the manner suggested. The circumstances of the case – as well as the subject matter and its background – may certainly be taken into account when determining the scope of the State’s margin of appreciation in assessing “whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment” (see paragraph 183 of the present judgment; see also, among many others, Rasmussen v. Denmark, 28 November 1984, § 40, Series A no. 87; Stummer v. Austria [GC], no. 37452/02, § 88, ECHR 2011; and Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 136, 19 December 2018). However, according to the Court’s case-law, the fact that the difference in treatment is based exclusively on grounds of nationality is precisely the decisive circumstance for leaving to States a reduced margin and requiring “very weighty reasons”. IV. APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE A. The ground of discrimination 9. The majority confirm the conclusion reached in Andrejeva, namely that nationality, or rather the absence of Latvian citizenship on the applicants’ part, is the sole criterion for the distinction complained of (see paragraph 193 of the present judgment). We agree. We would like to stress that the difference in treatment between citizens and permanently resident non-citizens is directly based on the ground of nationality. This was a deliberate choice on the part of the legislature. We are not dealing with a case of indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality resulting, for instance, from the application of a criterion such as length of residence in Latvia. We note that such a criterion could have made it possible to differentiate between the various applicants (who have lived in Latvia for different periods of their life), whereas the criterion actually applied allows for no such differentiation. By focusing on the “impugned features of the system ... [and] not the individual facts or circumstances of the particular applicants” (see paragraph 188 of the present judgment), the majority glosses over the differences between the applicants but also the alternatives open to the respondent State to comply with the Court’s previous judgment in Andrejeva. Such alternatives could have accommodated the legitimate aims pursued while respecting the principle of proportionality. 80