SAVICKIS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT
empowered to pass formal judgment on the legality or legitimacy of any
transfer of sovereignty under international law (see Ukraine v. Russia
(re Crimea) [GC] (dec.), nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, § 339, 16 December
2020), be it current or historical. Moreover, in principle, given the subsidiary
nature of the Convention system, it is not the Court’s task to substitute itself
for the domestic courts, particularly in cases where they assess facts of some
historical sensitivity (see, among many other authorities, Vasiliauskas
v. Lithuania [GC] (no. 35343/05, § 160, ECHR 2015).
103. On the other hand, the Court has always held that the provisions of
the Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. Despite its
specific character as a human rights instrument, the Convention is an
international treaty to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant norms
and principles of public international law. Thus, the Court has never
considered the provisions of the Convention to be the sole frame of reference
for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined therein. On the
contrary, it must also take into account any relevant rules and principles of
international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties (see,
among many other authorities, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc.
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 5809/08, § 134, 21 June 2016, and Naït-Liman
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 51357/07, § 174, 15 March 2018). The Court has
also repeatedly held that, while it is not its function to deal with errors of fact
or law allegedly committed by national courts – unless and in so far as they
may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention and
unless that domestic assessment is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable – it
can accept certain well-known historical truths and base its reasoning on
them. This principle also applies where domestic law refers to rules of general
international law or international agreements, and where domestic courts
apply principles of international law (see Vasiliauskas, cited above, ibid.,
with further references). However, the Court is empowered to do so in so far
as and only to the extent necessary for the exercise of its competence under
Article 19 of the Convention as defined above (see Ukraine v. Russia
(re Crimea), decision cited above, § 341).
104. As far as Latvia is concerned, the Court notes that its official position
as expounded in the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 17 February
2011 and in the written observations of the respondent Government in the
present case (see paragraphs 55 and 98-99 above) may be summarised as
follows. Latvia (as well as the neighbouring Baltics States of Lithuania and
Estonia) was a victim of aggression, unlawful occupation and annexation on
the part of the former Soviet Union, starting from 1940. Therefore, Latvia is
not a successor state to the USSR; it retains the statehood that existed when
its independence was lost de facto in 1940 but which nevertheless remained
in place de jure throughout the entire Cold War period. In other words, Latvia
never disappeared de jure, although its independence was forcibly interrupted
de facto for a half-century as a result of a blatant breach of international law.
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