SAVICKIS AND OTHERS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 3. In the present case, there are no good reasons to depart from the findings in Andrejeva v. Latvia, which has served as a precedent for the Court’s interpretation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, for more than a decade. None of the reasons indicated by the majority, which are smiliar to those submitted by the Government in Andrejeva, render the impugned difference of treatment compatible with the requirements of Article 14 of the Convention. This is even more so since thirteen years have passed since the judgment in Andrejeva was adopted, during which the economic and transitional reasons advanced by the Government have become even less cogent to justify a difference in treatment based solely on nationality (for the same conclusion, see the other dissenting opinion, paragraph 12). II. ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION: VERY WEIGHTY REASONS FOR DE JURE DISTINCTIONS BASED ON NATIONALITY A. Socio-economic context 4. According to the Court’s established case-law, very weighty reasons have to be put forward before the Court can regard a difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention (see Gaygusuz v. Austria, 16 September 1996, § 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; Koua Poirrez v. France, no. 40892/98, § 46, ECHR 2003-X; Andrejeva, cited above, § 87; and Luczak v. Poland, no. 77782/01, § 52, 27 November 2007). This also applies in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (ibid.). Although the margin of appreciation accorded to States in the context of general measures of economic or social policy is, in principle, wide, given their ability to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic grounds and their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, such measures must nevertheless be implemented in a manner that does not violate the prohibition of discrimination as set out in the Convention and complies with the requirement of proportionality (see J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom, nos. 32949/17 and 34614/17, § 88, 24 October 2019; Luczak, cited above, § 52; Fábián v. Hungary [GC], no. 78117/13, § 115, 5 September 2017, with further references). Among other areas, this general rule applies also in pension matters (see Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 55, ECHR 2006-VI, and Jurčić v. Croatia, no. 54711/15, § 64, 4 February 2021). 5. The Court explained in J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom that in the context of economic or social policy it had limited its acceptance to respect the legislature’s policy choice as not “manifestly without reasonable foundation” to circumstances where an alleged difference in treatment resulted from a transitional measure forming part of a scheme carried out in order to correct an inequality (see J.D. and A. v. the United Kingdom, cited 91